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Assessing the Impact of Ease of Doing Business and Corruption on Economic Growth for Africa Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) Member States  Wellington G. Bonga & Kenneth Mahuni  sirwellas@gmail.com, kennethmahuni@gmail.com  
Abstract: -A positive economic growth is one crucial macroeconomic objective of every nation. Many countries have formed regional as well as international trading blocs in an attempt to enhance economic growth and maximise welfare of each member state, the AFTZ member states are not an exception. This paper seeks to investigate the impact of ease of doing business and corruption on economic growth of AFTZ member states. The study employed a panel data analysis for the period 2010-2016, using Stata Statistical Software. The study findings for the bloc, indicated that corruption, trading across borders, getting credit, registration of property, dealing with construction permits, and starting business have a significant impact on the bloc’s economic growth; with insolvency resolving and investor protection of concern as well. Paying attention to country effects test, with the quest for efficient results, the study further divided the AFTZ bloc into 3 groups using average GDP as the determining variable. The usual 3 panel models were run for each group, with efficiency noted from the reported adjusted R-squared and overall R-squared. The study recommends each member state to pay particular attention to the identified affecting variables for improved economic growth. The onus to improve economic wellbeing of each state does not lie on the bloc only but on individual efforts as well, since individual differences prevail. All this will enable the broader efficacy and vision of AFTZ to be realised.  Key Words: Economic Growth, Ease of Doing Business, Doing Business Indicators, Corruption, AFTZ, Panel Data Analysis. JEL Codes: C01, C12, C33, F15, N17, O55  I. INTRODUCTION Africa is one region on the global map with countries still struggling to attract meaningful Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and hence economic growth rates, which are often low. The year 2015 witnessed one of the historic events on the continent, i.e. the creation of Africa’s largest trading bloc, the Africa Free Trade Zone (AFTZ). It consists of the following regional trading blocs in the continent; SADC, COMESA and EAC. Total membership is 26 states with a combined GDP of USD1.2 trillion and 620 million inhabitants.1 The most important thing is the diversity of the member states with their unique economic and political systems. Member states in the respective trading blocs, have internal challenges which even makes regional integration not so easy a task. Due to this, most of these countries have painfully lower economic growth rates, with FDI trickling in dribs and drabs which seldom transforms these economies meaningfully. So is this newly created bloc the panacea to Africa’s economic growth, economic integration challenges etc.? Will this bloc unlock the roadmap to attaining the continent’s agenda 2063? 2 Interestingly most of these countries share a common feature which is largely the difficult ease of doing business environments. These somehow ‘toxic’ business environments have resulted in major investments favouring other regions in the world where environments are much conducive. Thus, FDI is elusive for the continent even firms within the borders of the respective countries find it difficult to thrive fully within local environments, causing them to be shut out of the globalisation train given the tremendous speed it is moving at.3As a result, this project is a welcome development for the continent as it encourages member states to improve conditions within their borders to facilitate intra Africa trade in the long run. Doing business indicators is a broad index published by World Bank. It encompasses several parameters which define the ease of doing business in a country. The 10 parameters include, starting a business, registering a property, getting credit, trading across borders among others. The measures have been in use since 2005. According to World Bank there are two aggregate measures for doing business i.e. the ease of doing business ranking and the distance to frontier scores. The later shows the performance of an economy on 41 indicators for 10 doing business categories relative to the benchmark. For instance, if a country has a score of 50, on a category it means it is 50 percentage points away from the frontier as reflected in the performance of other countries in a given period. The ease of doing business ranking aims at assigning a rank for a country from 1-190, on how it will have performed on indicators relative to other countries. The best rank being 1 and the worst a country can be 
                                                             1 Extracted from http://www.ipsnews.net/2016/02/africa-launches-largest-trading-block-with-620-million-consumers/ 2 The long term vision of a prosperous Africa, a key goal of African Union member states 3Article by Mahuni K ‘The Globalisation of African firms’, Korea-Africa Centre Publications 
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ranked relative to others being 190. Problematic areas of Doing Business according to the World Economic Report Forum 2014-2015 include corruption, government bureaucracy and poor infrastructure among other areas. Africa is a promising continent due to the vast population and untapped natural resources. It has a youthful population which acts as a potential market, natural resources are potential sources of raw materials within and beyond the continent.4 All this can boost intra Africa trade, hence AFTZ bloc initiative is befitting for a continent still yearning for industrialisation. For countries in the AFTZ, Botswana, South Africa, Rwanda are some of the countries which have encouraging ease of doing business scores according to World Bank 2016 results. On the other hand, countries such as Zimbabwe, Libya, Somalia, and Eritrea are among poor scorers reflecting difficult business environments. Technology and infrastructure gaps currently exist in the continent in general, this increases cost of doing business. Another problem with Africa is that of corruption. Transparency International Report 2015 shows that for Sub Saharan Africa 40 out of 46 countries are in serious corruption crisis. High risk countries according to the report include, Angola, Burundi and Uganda.5 A study on corruption by Bonga (2014) using Zimbabwe as a case study has a few important pointers on how corruption is endemic in countries such as Zimbabwe in the continent; the study investigated the various forms of corruption, and showed an index of corruption of 6.8 out 10 (this showed a high affinity for the country Zimbabwe). This is a tip of the iceberg of how corruption is rooted in Zimbabwe. In light of   the preceding discussions, in order for efficacy of the AFTZ to be fully realised, besides ease of doing business parameters which need attention, the corruption factor is endemic in   Africa as reflected   by the brief look of some of AFTZ members.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES Fundamentally, the study seeks to examine how variations in economic growth is explained by doing business indicators for AFTZ member states, in particular which indicators are essentially important. Furthermore, the research also wants to determine the extent to which corruption determines economic growth variations within the member states besides the doing business indicators. All this helps to see what member states should do for the success of AFTZ, as its success undoubtedly partly hinges on how these twin issues are fully addressed.  II. AFTZ MEMBER STATES: A SYNOPSIS AFTZ covers the bulk of Southern and Central Africa and partially stretches to North Eastern Africa as shown in figure 1, the regions shaded in green.6 As alluded to earlier on, the region encompasses a mixed bag of countries with diverse dynamics in terms of economics, politics etc. For instance, in the zone you find some of the most corrupt, poorly managed states relative to some transparent and better managed states. Sadly, all these states have to find common ground for this initiative to work the desired magic through the continent. The conundrum then is, mixing the good and the bad, targeting to achieve the best.  Figure 1: Africa Free Trade Zone Member States 
 It’s worthwhile at this particular juncture to briefly look into some of these member states in particular those which have a lot of issues to do on their respective business environments and those that have fared fairly well in their environments. Also how some of these countries have been rated in as far as corruption is concerned shall be highlighted. In Southern Africa Botswana and South Africa, are countries which have progressed impressively in business environments relative to their other counterparts. For instance, on Doing Business as at 2016, the countries are ranked 71 and 74 respectively. Botswana is doing well given performance of its diamond mining sector. The corruption perception index (CRPI, hereafter) score for Botswana as at 2015 results is 63, which implies strong institutions. South Africa on the other hand, is a powerhouse of the continent which has 
                                                          
4 Article by John Berman “Seven reasons why Africa’s time is now” https://hbr.org/2013/10/seven-reasons-why-africas-time-is-now 5 Information obtained from https://www.iaca.int/images/news/2016/Corruption_Perceptions_Index_2015_report.pdf 6Wikipedia for full details on members. Available on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Free_Trade_Zone 
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strengths in key industries such as mining, manufacturing and processing. Whilst it is a powerhouse of the continent its CRPI score has been at 44. As at May 2016, Moody’s, a rating agency assigned South Africa   a credit rating of Baa2 although with a negative outlook. According to the report, corruption among other factors were the sources of risks which this country faces.7 Between March and April 2017 after the infamous cabinet reshuffle in South Africa, in particular the sacking of the finance ministry team among other factors led to downgrading of South Africa to ‘junk’ status by S & P8 as well as Fitch9, a clear testimony of increasing inconsistence and plummeting confidence levels for the economy. Recently, the proposals on the Mining Charter10 again in South Africa has added to uncertainty to the investor community. All this increases costs of doing business.  As at 2016, Zimbabwe and Tanzania were ranked a disappointing 161 and 132 respectively, with CRPI scores of 21 and 30. Angola, the other potential giant for the continent was ranked at 182 and a low CRPI score of 15, signifying heavy corruption and a toxic doing business environment. Egypt despite being a potential economic powerhouse for the continent, for the same period it was ranked 122 and had a score of 36, implying substantial corruption. Kenya, is the powerhouse in particular for the East African Community (EAC) regional bloc, despite a ranking of 92, a CRPI score of 25, points to huge corruption. Recently USA suspended aid to Kenya, one of the reasons cited was presence of corruption.  Rwanda is a   success story for the EAC bloc, which has made significant progress, with an impressive ranking of 54 and a score of 56 for CRPI for the same period. VW, the Germany car maker recently established an automobile plant in Rwanda, a testimony of improving doing business environment in the country and increasing investor confidence. The preceding brief discourse on conditions of member states of AFTZ, affirms that the countries are so diverse and worlds apart. Harmonising and marrying this diversity together will be the mortar which will bind this regional arrangement into one piece with a shared vision or else the envisaged vision remains but a field of dreams. Besides the discussed factors, other countries for instance Burundi, Somalia, DRC etc. occasionally have incidences of instability. Owing to fragility of states doing business becomes difficult. For instance, countries in the horn of Africa, Somalia, and Eritrea etc. often experience conflict and instability. This obviously makes ease of doing business difficult and investments in other potential sectors complex (Mahuni, 2016). All this adds, to hurdles regards to doing business. The poor corruption scores as reflected by most countries, implies that it is a cancer which is embedded in the structures of these economies. Thus we can safely conclude that the success of AFTZ will also hinge on how problems like corruption are decisively dealt with, besides attending to doing business indicators.   III. LITERATURE REVIEW Since the inception of doing business indicators, there is now a vast body of literature of studies trying to explain, this concept. In particular, a number of studies on how economic growth or FDI for a country or region is affected by the ease of doing business in a particular country or region. Overtime, World Bank is always refining these indicators, in terms of e.g. methodology of how some of these indicators are ascertained and expanding on how some of them are captured. Ani (2015) carried out a study on selected Asian countries so as to see how ease of doing business parameters impacted on economic growth within the countries under study. Dealing with construction permits and getting credit had a negative effect. On the other hand, registering a property and trade across borders were found to have a positive effect. Other variables were found not to be significant. A study by Kasongo (2013) on 40 sub Saharan Africa has important results on link between doing business and FDI inflows. Using seven panel data sets for the countries and FDI as the regress and, doing business indicators were used as regressors. Factors such as starting a business, cost of registering a property were found to be significant in determining FDI inflows in the region. The researcher also found that cost of starting a business, time to register a property, time to export were not significant. So as to explain how doing business indicators affect economic growth, Haidar (2012) used a sample of 172 countries using panel data spanning 2006-2010. The major finding of the research was that each additional improvement of business regulations resulted in 0.15 increase in economic growth for the period under study. Mahuni and Bonga (2017) studied how various Doing Business parameters impacted on FDI inflows for Zimbabwe showed that the country has a difficult ease of doing business environment in areas such enforcing contracts which stifles FDI inflows. Messaoud and Tehem (2014) conducted a study to investigate the link between business regulations for 162 countries from 2007 -2011.The majority of indicators were found to be significant in explaining growth, with the exception of trading across borders and dealing with construction permits. 
                                                            
7Moody’s Investor’s service. Available at http://www.stanlib.com/EconomicFocus/Pages/Moody'sconfirmedSA'ssovereigncreditratingatBaa2.aspx 8 A top credit rating agency 9  A top credit rating agency 10 The charter among other measures aims at reforming  the mining sector to allow blacks to have  a significant stake  
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World Bank’s International Financial Corporation (2012) is a report which is based on doing business with respect to countries in the Arab league. Its aim was to find out those factors which inhibit or promote Doing Business in the Arab region. The report shows that the Arab world is still grappling with problems like unemployment, low private sector investment etc. Governance was found to be the major hindrance which if manipulated well will help open up economies in the Arab world. Governance influences how institutions are run. In turn variables like enforcing contracts, corruption, getting credit, getting permits etc. will be affected directly or indirectly by governance.  Marek (2012) writing for the World Bank, sought to analyse the relationship between Doing Business, economic growth and regulatory reform. The goal of the paper was to see the importance of instituting reforms as a means of unlocking private sector investment so as to spur economic growth. The researcher acknowledges that whilst the Doing Business indicators cannot be relied upon entirely, they nevertheless help policy makers have a starting point. The research shows Doing Business aspects focusing on costs, have the greatest impact on explaining growth. The researcher singled out factors such as getting credit and enforcement of contracts.   IV. METHODOLOGY The study, for its analysis used secondary data for 26 countries collected from reliable sources namely; World Bank, Transparency International and UNCTAD statistics. The current study due to data availability, concentrated the analysis on the 2010-2016 period. Economic growth is the dependent variable proxied by annual GDP (Opeyemi, 2011). 11 variables are explaining economic growth; of which 10 are doing business indicators, while corruption index is the eleventh explaining variable. Corruption Perception Index as given by Transparency International assigns scores ranging from 0-100. A score such 100 implies a clean country, whereas a low score e.g. 10 signifies presence of high level of corruption. Doing business indicators, are taken as distance from frontier scores, a score of 100, is the benchmark and ideal for an economy while 1 is the unfavourable country position. The study chose the panel data analysis technique due to its ability over a short period of time to ensure adequate degrees of freedom for efficient results. Panel data estimation technique, has three models which can be equally used depending on efficient statistical tests namely; Pooled Ordinary Least Squares model, Fixed Effects model and Random Effects model. The choice of an appropriate model depends inter alia on the degree of homogeneity of the intercept and slope coefficients and the extent to which any individual cross-section effects are correlated with the explanatory variables (Song and Witt, 2000), and this is testable. The economic model for the research was specified as follows to show the functional relationship of the variables under study; )1(),,,,,,,,,,(  CRPIRIECTABPTPMIRPGCGEDCPSBfGDP  
The subsequent econometric model (which has both time dimension and cross-sectional dimension) of the above functional form can be expressed as follows;  
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Where;  GDP= gross domestic product, ߚ଴=constant term, ߚଵ -ߚଵଵ=slope coefficients, SB= starting business, DCP=dealing with construction permits, GE= getting electricity, RP=registering property, GC=getting credit, PMI=protecting investors, PT=paying taxes, TAB= trading across borders, EC= enforcing contracts, RI= resolving insolvency, CRPI=corruption perception index, ߝ=disturbance term,  - unobserved cross-sectional 
individual effects, v - is the idiosyncratic error,  - the unobserved time effects, i - denotes country and t -time dimension. Panel data models take into account a greater degree of the heterogeneity that characterises individuals, regions, firms or study units over time (Hsiao, 2003). Moreover, by combining time-series of cross-section observations, panel data can significantly increase the number of observations. Panel data allows the researcher to distinguish within group correlations from between group correlations (Moyo, 2013). With panel data, study results will remain efficient even if there are omitted variables in the regression equation.  V. DATA ANALYSIS AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL ESTIMATION The AFTZ has 26 countries, however the analysis has dropped Libya due to serious data problems, the study failed to obtain relevant data for the variables for the period under study. Therefore, the study uses 25 countries in its analysis. Due to the nature of the study and data collected, a panel data analysis is the best method to use. Panel data analysis relies on three methods, namely Pooled OLS model, Fixed Effects model and Random Effects model. Picking which model to use, usually depends on the study assumptions, and also panel tests can be carried to determine which model best suits the data. The current study will run the three models to confirm the results, and tests will also be done to determine the best model.  
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 5.1 Summary Statistics Summary statistics for the dependent variable and explanatory variables used in the study are shown below; 
  From the above table, it can be noticed that number of observations are not the same for some variables. This has been caused by data unavailability for some years for some countries. RI is the most affected with 143 observations as compared to the maximum 175 observations. The use of the STATA software is crucial in this scenario as it can hold missing data. Variability is higher in the dependant variable as indicated by a standard deviation of 87.38, and this has been shown by the range where the minimum is 0.53 billion and maximum of 416.42 billion; there is greater difference in national income among AFTZ nations for the period under study. For the explanatory variables, variability is almost the same for each variable, RP has the lowest variability of 11.39, while GC has 22.77.    5.2 Correlation Matrix Regressions for reliable results requires working with variables that are not serious correlated (correlation that does not exceed 0.8 – rule of thumb). The study undertook a multicollinearity test and results are shown below; 
  Form the results above, there is no serious correlation among the explanatory variables. The highest correlation is between CRPI and PT being 0.6373. Therefore, all explanatory variables will be included in the regressions.  5.3 Regression Results  The study undertook all the 3 panel data methods, and the results are presented below; Dep. Variable: GDP  
POOLED OLS MODEL RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
Variables Coef. t p-value Coef. z p-value Coef. t p-value CRPI -4.13 -4.14 0.000 *** 0.25 0.58 0.565 0.31 0.70 0.485 RI -0.49 -0.83 0.411 0.58 1.60 0.109 0.62 1.66 0.100* EC 1.26 1.45 0.148 0.44 1.11 0.269 0.44 1.08 0.282 TAB 1.37 2.75 0.007*** -0.11 -0.82 0.414 -0.11 -0.82 0.413 PT 0.75 0.70 0.483 -0.04 -0.14 0.892 -0.03 -0.09 0.928 PMI 0.43 0.49 0.625 0.50 2.02 0.043** 0.49 1.91 0.058* GC 1.31 2.94 0.004*** 0.10 0.67 0.503 0.08 0.50 0.617 RP 1.35 1.67 0.097* -0.02 -0.05 0.959 -0.01 -0.02 0.982 GE 0.39 0.61 0.542 -0.25 -0.96 0.337 -0.28 -1.04 0.302 DCP 1.08 1.76 0.080* -0.13 -0.55 0.580 -0.15 -0.62 0.537 SB 0.34 0.53 0.596 0.30 1.25 0.210 0.30 1.21 0.231 Constant -259.5 -3.04 0.003*** -19.76 -0.42 0.675 -20.32 -0.47 0.640  F (11, 135) = 3.86 (0.0001) Adjusted R-squared = 0.177 Root MSE = 84.434 
Wald chi2(11) =15.99 (0.1416) R-squared (overall) = 0.0177 Sigma (u) = 107.34, sigma (e) = 14.38, rho = 0.982 
F (11, 115) = 1.39 (0.1861) [ui]: F (20,115) = 226.87 (0.0000) R-squared (overall) = 0.0124  Significant; * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
          sb         175    68.70247     16.9939   26.12326   94.50762         dcp         168     63.5292     14.3363   26.66667   84.49052
                                                                                ge         175    59.61627    17.27305   20.43478   84.24401
          rp         175    60.76122    11.39051   27.61442   89.22528          gc         173     40.7659    22.77071          5         95
         pmi         175    47.22385    14.42381   16.66667         80          pt         175    67.92771    13.51239   31.32492   91.91568
                                                                               tab         174    50.66476    20.27929       1.26      92.68
          ec         175    49.56035    12.82037   25.21676      68.65          ri         147    32.32252    16.05922   .0537139   72.50442
        crpi         175    33.52571    12.64085         11         65         gdp         175    45.68154    87.38279        .53     416.42
                                                                          Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
          sb     0.3008   0.1019   0.1586   0.2685   0.1928   0.5886   0.2614   0.2767   0.2512   0.1884   1.0000         dcp     0.4377   0.3965   0.0839   0.3239   0.2942   0.1494   0.2979   0.0454   0.3298   1.0000
          ge     0.4472   0.4477   0.4578   0.2681   0.0461   0.1013   0.4564   0.2034   1.0000          rp     0.1693   0.0551   0.0929  -0.1593   0.1289   0.1188   0.1524   1.0000
          gc     0.4214   0.2326   0.4497  -0.0003   0.1858   0.4896   1.0000         pmi     0.5059   0.1853   0.4206   0.2847   0.4888   1.0000
          pt     0.6373   0.4735   0.2879   0.3782   1.0000         tab     0.4894   0.4400   0.0675   1.0000
          ec     0.5034   0.2719   1.0000          ri     0.5505   1.0000
        crpi     1.0000                                                                                                                 
                   crpi       ri       ec      tab       pt      pmi       gc       rp       ge      dcp       sb
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  Table above shows the results of the regression results for the three models. The Pooled OLS model shows that 5 variables significantly explain GDP levels for the AFTZ countries, while the Fixed Effects model shows that only 2 variables are significant and the Random Effects model has 1 significant variable, and also a marginally insignificant variable. The Pooled OLS model regression results are contradicting both the Random Effects and the Fixed Effects Model.  The AFTZ as a region, the study has already assumed pooling of data for the region for a collaborative analysis, implying the reliance on the Pooled OLS model. The Pooled OLS model, shows that CRPI, TAB and GC are the most significant variables explain GDP levels (significant at 1% level), and RP and DCP are significant at 10% level. CRPI, the corruption index has a negative significant coefficient (-4.13), implying that the corruption levels in the region negatively affects the income levels. TAB, GC, RP and DCP all have positive significant coefficients, indicating a positive contribution to regional income levels. Variables RI, EC, PT, PMI, GE and SB have been found to insignificantly affect regional income.  5.3.1 Panel Tests Although the study assumptions require pooling of data, there is greater need to do panel tests to determine the most efficient methodology. Panel tests carried out, include the Chow test (Fixed effects test), the LM test (Breusch and Pagan test) and the Hausman test. The Chow test reported an F-value of 226.87 with a p-value of 0.0000, indicating that the Fixed Effects model is preferred to the Pooled OLS model. The Breusch and Pagan LM test reported a chi-square statistic of 329.43 with a p-value of 0.0000, indicating that the Random Effects model is preferred to the Pooled OLS model. The two tests are in agreement with each other, causing the study to question its original assumption (though this does not guarantee the assumption to be dropped). Choosing between the Random Effects and the Fixed Effects, the Hausman test is used. The Hausman test reported a Chi-square statistic of 1.16 with a p-value of 0.9999, implying that the Random Effects model is preferred to the Fixed Effects model. From the panel tests carried out, it is then necessary to consider the regression results of the Random Effects model. The two variables RI and PMI have been found to significantly explain regional income levels, RI with a negative impact while PMI with a positive impact. The results show that investor protection environment if improved will yield higher economic growth. The region should also aim to improve how it resolves insolvency.  5.3.2 Time Effects Test and Country Effects test To determine the best model for the data analysis, there is greater need to check for time effects and country effects, and sometimes the joint effect of time and country effects. Time effects test results are presented below; 
 The time effects test reported an F-statistic of 1.41 with a p-value of 0.2174, implying that the time effects are insignificant. The impact of time has failed to explain the growth in regional income levels for the period under study. Country effects test results are presented below; 
 The country effects test reported an F-statistic of 230.01 with a p-value of 0.0000, this implies that country effects are present for the countries in the AFTZ region. The country effects test, indicates that, while we may want to pool the countries (as previously assumed), there exist some differences in the region which may prevent the pooling of the countries together for a meaningful analysis. Results from the Pooled OLS may not help to the fullest for policy derivation.  5.4 Grouping AFTZ Member States According to GDP Levels  The study, using the results of the country effects test, have used country average national income for the period under study to further divide the 25 AFTZ countries into 3 groups. The groups are shown in the following table; 
            Prob > F =    0.2174       F(  6,   109) =    1.41
 ( 6)  _Iyear_2016 = 0 ( 5)  _Iyear_2015 = 0
 ( 4)  _Iyear_2014 = 0 ( 3)  _Iyear_2013 = 0
 ( 2)  _Iyear_2012 = 0 ( 1)  _Iyear_2011 = 0
. test _Iyear_2011 _Iyear_2012 _Iyear_2013 _Iyear_2014 _Iyear_2015 _Iyear_2016
            Prob > F =    0.0000       F( 20,   109) =  230.01
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AVERAGE GDP (2010-2016) GROUP I GROUP II GROUP III RSA 359.69 Uganda 24.34 Madagascar 9.94 Egypt 285.34 Zambia 23.59 Rwanda 7.41 Angola 106.61 Botswana 14.86 Malawi 6.34 Sudan 78.29 Zimbabwe 14.23 Swaziland 4.43 Kenya 54.74 Mozambique 13.80 Eritrea 3.34 Ethiopia 49.33 DRC 12.11 Burundi 2.68 Tanzania 41.43 Namibia 12.00 Lesotho 2.49   Mauritius 11.71 Djibouti 1.48     Seychelles 1.27     Comoros 0.59  The 25 countries have been grouped using the average GDP levels for the 2010-2016 period. Group I with higher income has 7 countries, South Africa, Egypt and Angola topping the group. Group II has 8 countries, Uganda, Zambia and Botswana topping the group. Group III has 10 countries, with Madagascar, Rwanda and Malawi on the top, while Comoros, Seychelles and Djibouti on the bottom list. The grouping depends on the range of average national income.   5.4.1 GROUP I REGRESSIONS South Africa, Egypt, Angola, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania. Group I countries have the highest average GDP levels for the period under study, South Africa with an average of US$359.69 billion topping the group while Tanzania recorded US$41.43 billion. Worth to note is that the range remains large for this group despite efforts to classify are concerned. Summary statistics for Group I are shown below; 
 Variability has changed for this group as compared to first regression. Only GDP the dependant variable has shown that there is greater variation among the countries, and this has been necessitated by greater income values for the Group I countries. For the explaining variables variability has reduced significantly from the statistics of the whole AFTZ member states.   Three panel data methodologies have been estimated for the group and results are shown below; Dep. Variable: GDP 
POOLED OLS MODEL RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
Variables Coef. t p-value Coef. z p-value Coef. t p-value CRPI 9.71 6.61 0.000*** 9.71 6.61 0.000*** 2.18 1.63 0.115 RI 1.03 0.46 0.648 1.03 0.46 0.645 3.47 2.86 0.008*** EC -3.76 -2.46 0.020** -3.75 -2.46 0.014** 1.90 1.44 0.162 TAB 0.47 0.72 0.477 0.47 0.72 0.471 -0.56 -1.57 0.129 PT 1.95 1.76 0.088* 1.95 1.72 0.078* 3.08 3.88 0.001*** PMI -0.52 -0.44 0.665 -0.52 -0.44 0.662 1.63 2.59 0.016** GC 0.19 0.24 0.811 0.19 0.24 0.810 -0.14 -0.36 0.723 RP 4.34 2.32 0.027** 4.34 2.32 0.020** -3.15 -1.48 0.153 GE -2.41 -2.10 0.045** -2.41 -2.10 0.036** -1.14 -1.85 0.076* DCP 2.68 2.67 0.012** 2.68 2.67 0.008*** 3.06 4.11 0.000*** SB 2.50 1.74 0.091* 2.50 1.74 0.081* 6.55 5.14 0.000*** Constant -561.2 -2.44 0.021** -561.2 -2.44 0.015** -751.6 -4.03 0.000***  F (11, 30) = 43.63 (0.0000) Adjusted R-squared = 0.9196 Root MSE = 37.436 
Wald chi2(11) = 479.88 (0.0000) R-squared (overall) = 0.9412 Sigma (u) = 0, sigma (e) = 17.05, rho = 0 
F(11,25)= 6.08 (0.0001) [ui]: F(5,25) = 23.91 (0.0000) R-squared (overall) = 0.6079 
 Significant; * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% From the above regressions, the three models have indicated that most variables significantly explain the levels of national income for the member states. The Pooled OLS and the Random Effects models are in 
          sb          49    69.29364    15.96209   27.94785   87.48431         dcp          49    64.13637    10.85532   45.43057    82.4995
                                                                                ge          49    66.82023    10.44741   40.97068   84.21494
          rp          49     60.9209    11.46626   27.61442   78.65303          gc          49    41.78571    22.59528          5      81.25
         pmi          49    45.83347    17.49563   16.66667         80          pt          49    65.44926    11.01221   48.08729   88.90432
                                                                               tab          49    47.98283    16.54575   17.99718   71.56375
          ec          49    51.22884    14.35037   25.21676   66.17498          ri          42    30.73027    5.555245    18.1016   38.40379
        crpi          49    28.06122    9.527172         11         45         gdp          49    139.3471    122.9018      29.93     416.42
                                                                          Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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agreement; the two models have indicated that seven (7) variables significantly explain economic growth for the member states. Significant variables are CRPI, EC, PT, RP, GE DCP and SB; CRPI (an index of corruption levels) being the major determinant significant at 1% level, however with a positive impact. The Fixed Effects model shows six (6) significant variables; adding RI and PMI as significant variables, which have been rejected by the other two models. The other significant variables include PMI, GE, DCP and SB. RP, EC and TAB are marginally insignificant.  5.4.2 GROUP II REGRESSIONS Uganda, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, DRC, Namibia and Mauritius. Group II countries have the medium average income for the period under study, Uganda tops the group with an average of US$24.34 billion annually, and Mauritius is the last with US$11.71 billion.  Summary statistics for Group II are  shown below; 
   Variability for GDP is significantly lower as compared to the whole AFTZ group, this shows that Group II countries have relatively similar income levels. Variability of the explaining variables, reported a minimum of 9.896 (RP) and a maximum of 19.762 (RI), a range which can be termed marginal.   Group II regression results for the 3 panel data models are presented below; Dep. Variable: GDP 
POOLED OLS MODEL RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
Variables Coef. t p-value Coef. z p-value Coef. t p-value CRPI -0.13 -1.17 0.248 -0.13 -1.17 0.240 0.31 2.01 0.053* RI 0.12 1.33 0.192 0.12 1.33 0.183 0.01 0.09 0.930 EC 0.15 1.72 0.093* 0.15 1.72 0.085* 0.07 0.88 0.388 TAB -0.07 -1.64 0.109 -0.07 -1.64 0.101 0.02 0.43 0.667 PT -0.24 -1.17 0.249 -0.24 -1.17 0.242 0.11 0.45 0.654 PMI -0.14 -0.87 0.389 -0.14 -0.87 0.383 0.16 1.54 0.135 GC 0.08 1.95 0.058* 0.08 1.95 0.051* 0.01 0.29 0.770 RP -0.04 -0.50 0.622 -0.04 -0.50 0.619 0.31 2.93 0.006*** GE -0.22 -3.13 0.003*** -0.22 -3.13 0.002*** 0.02 0.25 0.803 DCP -0.06 -0.72 0.473 -0.06 -0.72 0.469 0.03 0.45 0.656 SB 0.35 2.75 0.009*** 0.35 2.75 0.006*** 0.28 1.76 0.089* Constant 27.63 2.39 0.022** 27.62 2.39 0.017** -61.12 -2.55 0.016**  F (11, 37) = 11.57 (0.0000) Adjusted R-squared = 0.7078 Root MSE = 2.9283 
Wald chi2(11) = 127.26 (0.0000) R-squared (overall) = 0.7747 Sigma (u) = 0, sigma (e) = 1.779, rho = 0 
F (11,31) = 3.46 (0.0031) [ui]: F (6,31) = 11.54 (0.0000) R-squared (overall) = 0.0511 
 Significant; * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%  For Group II countries, both Pooled OLS model and the Random Effects model reported that four variables significantly explain economic growth, and both models are in agreement for signs and magnitude of variables. EC, GC, GE and SB are the significant variables, with GE and SB significant at 1 percent level. The Fixed Effects model reported three significant variables; CRPI, RP and SB; CRPI and RP have a negative impact on income levels while SB have a positive impact on economic growth levels of the member states.   5.4.3 GROUP III REGRESSIONS Madagascar, Rwanda, Malawi, Swaziland, Eritrea, Burundi, Lesotho, Djibouti, Seychelles and Comoros. Group III countries are the low income countries as defined by the average GDP levels for the period under study. Madagascar tops the group with an average of US$9.94 billion, while Comoros has the lowest average of US$0.59 billion per annum. 
          sb          56    69.43502    17.09278   26.76988   91.62683         dcp          56    63.38859    16.88026   26.66667   84.49052
                                                                                ge          56    61.07186    16.82445   33.47826   84.24401
          rp          56    61.24474    9.896014   41.53877   78.82247          gc          56    50.89286    19.37183      18.75       87.5
         pmi          56    52.02387    12.43244   23.33333   76.66666          pt          56    68.90017    15.02557   31.32492   91.91568
                                                                               tab          56    47.88032     23.2687       1.26   87.74397
          ec          56    51.66732    13.02353      27.32      68.65          ri          49    41.42435    19.76214   .0537139   72.50442
        crpi          56    37.16071    14.89451         20         65         gdp          56    15.83071    5.336429       7.83      28.05
                                                                          Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Statistics for Group II countries are  presented below; 
 Just like Group II countries, Group III have reported a lower variability for GDP. The explaining variables also have variability that is almost the same for each variable, the range is very small between the highest and the lowest. Such statistics indicate similarity among the member states.   Group III panel data regressions are presented below;  Dep. Variable: GDP 
POOLED OLS MODEL RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
Variables Coef. t p-value Coef. z p-value Coef. t p-value CRPI 0.04 0.73 0.468 0.04 0.73 0.464 0.01 0.49 0.626 RI -0.15 -4.51 0.000*** -0.15 -4.51 0.000*** 0.04 1.09 0.282 EC -0.02 -0.28 0.784 -0.02 -0.28 0.783 0.02 0.51 0.614 TAB 0.07 4.03 0.000*** 0.07 4.03 0.000*** -0.02 -1.57 0.126 PT 0.10 2.49 0.017** 0.10 2.49 0.013** 0.04 2.18 0.036** PMI 0.01 0.44 0.662 0.01 0.44 0.660 -0.01 -1.12 0.272 GC 0.09 7.02 0.000*** 0.09 7.02 0.000*** 0.02 1.72 0.094* RP -0.07 -2.04 0.047** -0.07 -2.04 0.041** -0.004 -0.21 0.838 GE -0.10 -3.86 0.000*** -0.10 -3.86 0.000*** 0.001 0.04 0.968 DCP -0.02 -0.80 0.427 -0.02 -0.80 0.423 0.01 0.67 0.508 SB 0.02 0.74 0.462 0.02 0.74 0.458 0.02 1.42 0.165 Constant 2.70 0.92 0.362 2.70 0.92 0.357 -1.70 -0.72 0.474  F (11, 44) = 19.15 (0.0000) Adjusted R-squared = 0.7840 Root MSE = 1.3928 
Wald chi2(11) = 210.63 (0.0000) R-squared (overall) = 0.8272 Sigma (u) = 0, sigma (e) = 0.4737, rho = 0 
F(11,37)= 3.01 (0.0059) [ui]: F(7,37) = 49.05 (0.0000) R-squared (overall) = 0.0276 
 Significant; * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%  Group III regressions have reported that the Pooled and the Random Effects Model presents similar results. Both models have reported six significant variables; RI, RP and GE with negative impact, and TAB, PT and GC with positive impact. The Fixed Effects model reported two significant variables; PT and GC with positive impact; the variables have been also reported to be significant with same signs by the other two models.  5.5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF REGRESSION RESULTS The study employed the Panel data regression technique to analyse the data for the AFTZ member states. The study assumed the Pooled OLS model for the entire group. However, recognising the panel tests (chow, LM and Haussmann) for a better and efficient model, the study also has to run the Random Effects and the Fixed Effects models. Time effects and country effects models have been done, leading to the further division of the group into 3 using the average GDP as the dividing parameter. Four data sets have been run, the whole group of 25 member states, and the 3 divisions of the member states. The summary of the regressions done are shown in the table below; Dep. Variable: GDP 
25 AFTZ MEMBERS GROUP I [7 countries] GROUP II [8 countries] GROUP III [10 countries] 
Variables POLS REM FEM POLS REM FEM POLS REM FEM POLS REM FEM CRPI ***   *** ***    *    RI   *   ***    *** ***  EC    ** **  * *     TAB ***         *** ***  PT    * * ***    ** ** ** PMI  ** *   **       GC ***      * *  *** *** * RP *   ** **    *** ** **  GE    ** ** * *** ***  *** ***  DCP *   ** *** ***       SB *   * * *** *** *** *     Significant; * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. POLS – Pooled OLS, REM – Random Effects Model, FEM – Fixed Effects Model. 
          sb          70    67.70261    17.78859   26.12326   94.50762         dcp          63    63.18195    14.46273    36.0999   83.65742
                                                                                ge          70    53.40903    19.31738   20.43478   80.05976
          rp          70    60.26263    12.53785   39.67756   89.22528          gc          68    31.69118    22.07282          5         95
         pmi          70     44.3571    12.65256         20   66.66666          pt          70    68.88465    13.78592   41.65379   85.67601
                                                                               tab          69    54.82916    19.64524   16.64528      92.68
          ec          70    46.70683    11.05356      28.39   65.43989          ri          56    25.55261    14.08384    3.38904   42.72675
        crpi          70    34.44286    11.41019         18         55         gdp          70    3.996286    2.939262        .53      10.67
                                                                          Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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The table above gives a summary of the data analysis done by the current study. The AFTZ as a region to improve economic growth have to pay attention to 6 variables affecting the economic growth of the region. These include corruption levels, boarder trading, credit issues, registration of property, construction permits handling and starting business issues. The bloc has to check on the effect of these variables on the economic growth and act to improve accordingly. Corruption levels, boarder trading management and controls, and credit lines are the major significant variables to be dealt with. Not undermining the results of the REM and FEM, the bloc should also address how it resolves issues of insolvency and also improves on investor protection to attract foreign direct investment. The study results also indicated that, in as much as the bloc might need to address collectively on issues affecting economic growth of the member states, there is greater need to separate the member states into smaller groups and fight further the impacting variables. Thus, the study came up with 3 groups (I, II and III). Each nation within the AFTZ bloc, should also check on what group it falls and check on which variables it should address strongly for the attainment of high levels of growth. Group I countries, being the high income nations, have resolving insolvency, payment of taxes, dealing with construction permits, starting business, investor protection and getting electricity as significant variables confirming economic growth levels of the member states. The results are drawn from the FEM, which is the best model as per panel tests. Countries in this group should also address issues of corruption, contracts enforcements, and property registration as reported from the POLS and REM regressions, whose results should not be neglected. Worth to note for this group is that, country differences are significant as reported by country effects test (see Appendix B), implying that there are differences that prevail for individual nations, which has to be investigated separately. Time effects are insignificant. Group II countries, rated as middle income for this study among AFTZ bloc, have registration of property, starting a business and corruption as the significant variables affecting economic growth of member states as reported by the FEM (the best model from panel tests). The group should also have a concern on factors namely; enforcement of contracts, getting credit and getting electricity, which have been reported as significant by the POLS and REM. Time effects have been found significant for this group, indicating that economic growth has been changing with the effect of time, implying a transition. Country differences have also been noted for this group, implying that individual analysis is recommended for efficient analysis. Group III, composed of lower income countries among the AFTZ bloc, have reported crucial results as well. The Haussmann test, failed to meet the asymptotic assumptions and hence could not report. The Chow test favoured the FEM, while the LM test favoured the REM. Therefore, both models will be reported, and worth to note is that the POLS and the REM have results which are in agreement, from coefficients to p-values. Member states in Group III, should pay attention to variables namely; insolvency resolving, trading across borders, payment of taxes, getting of credit, registration of properties, and electricity provision (reported by the REM and POLS, the FEM also supported the results, though it only mentions PT and GC as the only significant variables). Country differences have been reported, implying further separation required for efficient results. Time effects are insignificant for this group of countries (see Appendix C). The methodology adopted in this study, has an efficiency   tracing component, and hence recommended for policy use. The initial model for the whole bloc, reported an adjusted r-squared and an overall r-squared of 0.177 and 0.0177 for the POLS and REM respectively; and further division of the bloc to three groups have led to the reporting of higher figures of the parameters (0.9196:0.9412, 0.7078:0.7747 and 0.7840:0.8272, for the 3 groups respectively). The FEM reported the same efficiency improvement, though the greatest was for Group I, reporting an overall r-squared of 0.6079. There is greater encouragement for member states to work on improving various doing business indicators, so as for the bloc to improve economic growth.     VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  The study has shown how Doing Business indicators should be at the heart and soul of AFTZ trading bloc. Attending to the issues explored in the study is the mortar, which will bind the member states together. The paper has shown how diversity of the member states on their own largely makes it difficult for cross border transactions to be carried with efficiency. The variable TAB attests to this. Thus the member states should strive to open up their borders so as to increase inter Africa trade by reducing barriers among member states .Whilst previous studies on the similar subject have largely dwelt on only the 10 Doing Business indicators given by the World Bank, the study added corruption as it has resulted in the continent haemorrhaged of massive resources through leakages further complicating doing business. Corruption proved to be significant and thus success of this trading bloc will depend too on attending to corruption.    It has also been shown that the diversity of the member states also requires individual efforts by the member states in addressing issues around, credit, registration of property, construction permits handling and starting 
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business issues within their respective domains. This is corroborated by country effects carried out during the regressions. This will allow convergence around the bloc to be much easier.  The study also recommends that an oversight board be formed by the member states especially consisting of technical people who will work closely with World Bank on guidance and policy direction. Its function will be to design and help member states with a framework of addressing local business environments. This allows also to make sure that member states do conform and align their economies with the bloc’s expectations. The major shortcoming of the study though was data unavailability .Thus we recommend for future studies a wider data span to give an appreciation of other factors which may come up. Nevertheless, the study acts as an indispensable policy guide that should be at the disposal of AFTZ member states in their vision for economic growth of the continent.    REFERENCES  [1]. Ani G.T (2015). Effects of Doing Business to Economic Growth among selected countries in Asia, Asia Pacific Journals of Multidisciplinary Research, Volume 3 No.5 December 2015. [2]. Bonga W. G (2014). An Empirical Investigation of the Nature of Corruption in Zimbabwe. Doctorate Thesis, Atlantic International University, Honolulu, Hawaii. [3]. Haidar J. I (2012). The impact of business regulatory reforms on economic growth. Journal of The Japanese and International Economies (26) pp 285-307. [4]. Hsiao, C. 2003, “Analysis of Panel Data (2nd ed.)”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [5]. International Finance Corporation, World Bank (2012) Doing Business in the Arab World: Doing Business in a More Transparent World. [6]. Kasongo K. B (2013). Foreign Direct Investment in Sub Saharan Africa Countries: Does the business regulation matter? Lessons from DR Congo, Seoul National University [7]. Mahuni K. (2016). Analysis of Climate Change on Agricultural Commodity Dependent Developing Countries (CDDCs): Case of Sub Saharan African Countries. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2876035  [8]. Mahuni K, and Bonga W. G (2017). Nexus between Doing Business Indicators and Foreign Direct Investment for Zimbabwe. A Time Series analysis.  Dynamic Research Journals’ Journal of Economics and Finance, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp. 01-08. [9]. Mahuni K. (2016). The Globalisation of African firms. Korea Africa Centre Publications [10]. Marek H. 2012. The Doing Business Indicators, Economic Growth and Regulatory Reform. Policy Research Working Paper; 6176. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/12020 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.” [11]. Messaoud B, and Tehem Ghak El Z (2014). Business regulations and economic growth. What can be explained? International Strategic Management Review 2 pp 64-78. [12]. Moyo, V 2013, “Modelling the Capital Structure of Manufacturing, Mining and Retail Firms Listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange”, Doctorate thesis (Financial Management Studies), University of Pretoria. [13]. Opeyemi, A (2012) A re-examination of the twin deficit phenomenon in the Nigerian economy, College of Development Studies, Covenant University. [14]. Song H., Witt S.F. (2000), ‘Tourism Demand Modelling and Forecasting: Modern Econometric Approaches’, Pergamum, and Cambridge. [15]. Wooldridge, J (2009) Introductory Econometrics, A Modern Approach 5th Edition, Michigan State University. [16]. World Economic Forum Report 2014-2015.               
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APPENDIX   A. AFTZ MEMBER STATES REGRESSIONS (25 COUNTRIES)  POOLED OLS MODEL 
  RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
   FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
 
                                                                                     _cons    -259.4851     85.269    -3.04   0.003     -428.121    -90.8493
          sb     .3444119   .6478087     0.53   0.596    -.9367543    1.625578         dcp     1.077001   .6107113     1.76   0.080    -.1307977      2.2848
          ge     .3860276   .6318751     0.61   0.542    -.8636268    1.635682          rp     1.353302   .8088505     1.67   0.097    -.2463556    2.952959
          gc     1.314981    .446574     2.94   0.004     .4317953    2.198167         pmi     .4336617   .8861184     0.49   0.625    -1.318808    2.186131
          pt     .7507189   1.066891     0.70   0.483    -1.359264    2.860702         tab     1.374611   .4996999     2.75   0.007     .3863581    2.362863
          ec     1.260449   .8666519     1.45   0.148    -.4535218     2.97442          ri    -.4943695   .5990056    -0.83   0.411    -1.679018    .6902791
        crpi    -4.131669   .9985681    -4.14   0.000     -6.10653   -2.156809                                                                              
         gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]                                                                              
       Total    1265000.86   146  8664.38947           Root MSE      =  84.434                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1772
    Residual    962429.123   135  7129.10461           R-squared     =  0.2392       Model     302571.74    11  27506.5218           Prob > F      =  0.0001
                                                       F( 11,   135) =    3.86      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     147
         rho    .98237152   (fraction of variance due to u_i)     sigma_e    14.382845
     sigma_u    107.36809                                                                              
       _cons    -19.76232   47.14185    -0.42   0.675    -112.1586      72.634          sb     .3022951   .2409979     1.25   0.210    -.1700521    .7746424
         dcp    -.1280204   .2316009    -0.55   0.580    -.5819497    .3259089          ge    -.2462003   .2563169    -0.96   0.337    -.7485723    .2561716
          rp    -.0166015   .3214449    -0.05   0.959     -.646622     .613419          gc     .0998141   .1491077     0.67   0.503    -.1924316    .3920598
         pmi     .5011586   .2480503     2.02   0.043     .0149891    .9873282          pt    -.0431657   .3167725    -0.14   0.892    -.6640283    .5776969
         tab    -.1126039   .1377969    -0.82   0.414    -.3826809    .1574731          ec     .4362578   .3944216     1.11   0.269    -.3367944     1.20931
          ri     .5778022   .3606208     1.60   0.109    -.1290017    1.284606        crpi      .249572   .4336094     0.58   0.565    -.6002868    1.099431
                                                                                       gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.1416Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(11)      =     15.99
       overall = 0.0177                                        max =         7       between = 0.0159                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1169                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =        21Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       147
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 115) =   226.87             Prob > F = 0.0000                                                                              
         rho    .97708471   (fraction of variance due to u_i)     sigma_e    14.382845
     sigma_u    93.917868                                                                              
       _cons    -20.31669   43.34886    -0.47   0.640    -106.1825    65.54906          sb     .2976304   .2469657     1.21   0.231    -.1915612     .786822
         dcp    -.1470634   .2376708    -0.62   0.537    -.6178436    .3237168          ge    -.2753455   .2655563    -1.04   0.302    -.8013613    .2506704
          rp    -.0074794   .3306692    -0.02   0.982    -.6624714    .6475127          gc     .0768005   .1532933     0.50   0.617    -.2268441     .380445
         pmi     .4856558   .2537549     1.91   0.058    -.0169838    .9882954          pt    -.0292943   .3247683    -0.09   0.928    -.6725978    .6140092
         tab     -.115953   .1410926    -0.82   0.413    -.3954303    .1635242          ec     .4447084   .4114067     1.08   0.282    -.3702091    1.259626
          ri      .622548   .3759545     1.66   0.100    -.1221455    1.367242        crpi     .3140936   .4479396     0.70   0.485    -.5731885    1.201376
                                                                                       gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0871                        Prob > F           =    0.1861                                                F(11,115)          =      1.39
       overall = 0.0124                                        max =         7       between = 0.0106                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1175                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =        21Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       147
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BREUSCH AND PAGAN LM TEST 
   HAUSMAN TEST 
   FIXED EFFECTS TEST 
     
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000                              chi2(1) =   329.43
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     11527.91       107.3681                       e     206.8662       14.38284
                     gdp     8664.389        93.0827                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)        Estimated results:
        gdp[code,t] = Xb + u[code] + e[code,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9999                          =        1.16
                 chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                                        sb      .2976304     .3022951       -.0046648        .0539636
         dcp     -.1470634    -.1280204        -.019043        .0533711          ge     -.2753455    -.2462003       -.0291451        .0694389
          rp     -.0074794    -.0166015        .0091221        .0775581          gc      .0768005     .0998141       -.0230136        .0355772
         pmi      .4856558     .5011586       -.0155028        .0535035          pt     -.0292943    -.0431657        .0138714        .0716217
         tab      -.115953    -.1126039       -.0033491         .030317          ec      .4447084     .4362578        .0084506        .1169916
          ri       .622548     .5778022        .0447458        .1062751        crpi      .3140936      .249572        .0645216        .1123954
                                                                                                 fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 115) =   226.87             Prob > F = 0.0000                                                                              
         rho    .97708471   (fraction of variance due to u_i)     sigma_e    14.382845
     sigma_u    93.917868                                                                              
       _cons    -20.31669   43.34886    -0.47   0.640    -106.1825    65.54906          sb     .2976304   .2469657     1.21   0.231    -.1915612     .786822
         dcp    -.1470634   .2376708    -0.62   0.537    -.6178436    .3237168          ge    -.2753455   .2655563    -1.04   0.302    -.8013613    .2506704
          rp    -.0074794   .3306692    -0.02   0.982    -.6624714    .6475127          gc     .0768005   .1532933     0.50   0.617    -.2268441     .380445
         pmi     .4856558   .2537549     1.91   0.058    -.0169838    .9882954          pt    -.0292943   .3247683    -0.09   0.928    -.6725978    .6140092
         tab     -.115953   .1410926    -0.82   0.413    -.3954303    .1635242          ec     .4447084   .4114067     1.08   0.282    -.3702091    1.259626
          ri      .622548   .3759545     1.66   0.100    -.1221455    1.367242        crpi     .3140936   .4479396     0.70   0.485    -.5731885    1.201376
                                                                                       gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0871                        Prob > F           =    0.1861                                                F(11,115)          =      1.39
       overall = 0.0124                                        max =         7       between = 0.0106                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1175                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =        21Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       147
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 B. GROUP I REGRESSIONS  POOLED OLS MODEL 
  RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
  FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
 
       _cons    -561.1678   230.2674    -2.44   0.021    -1031.437     -90.899          sb     2.502309   1.434594     1.74   0.091     -.427522    5.432141
         dcp     2.682744   1.004265     2.67   0.012     .6317603    4.733727          ge    -2.409003   1.149036    -2.10   0.045    -4.755646    -.062359
          rp     4.335462   1.866188     2.32   0.027     .5241982    8.146726          gc     .1898015   .7873636     0.24   0.811     -1.41821    1.797813
         pmi    -.5162823   1.179999    -0.44   0.665    -2.926162    1.893598          pt     1.954646   1.107783     1.76   0.088    -.3077491     4.21704
         tab     .4656667   .6466125     0.72   0.477    -.8548922    1.786226          ec    -3.757826   1.527967    -2.46   0.020     -6.87835   -.6373007
          ri     1.029479   2.231927     0.46   0.648    -3.528724    5.587683        crpi     9.707906   1.469475     6.61   0.000     6.706838    12.70897
                                                                                       gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    714571.203    41  17428.5659           Root MSE      =  37.436                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9196
    Residual    42043.7684    30  1401.45895           R-squared     =  0.9412       Model    672527.435    11  61138.8577           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11,    30) =   43.63      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      42
                                                                                       rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    17.053393     sigma_u            0
                                                                                     _cons    -561.1678   230.2674    -2.44   0.015    -1012.484    -109.852
          sb     2.502309   1.434594     1.74   0.081    -.3094427    5.314061         dcp     2.682744   1.004265     2.67   0.008     .7144199    4.651068
          ge    -2.409003   1.149036    -2.10   0.036    -4.661071   -.1569343          rp     4.335462   1.866188     2.32   0.020     .6778013    7.993123
          gc     .1898015   .7873636     0.24   0.810    -1.353403    1.733006         pmi    -.5162823   1.179999    -0.44   0.662    -2.829038    1.796474
          pt     1.954646   1.107783     1.76   0.078    -.2165692     4.12586         tab     .4656667   .6466125     0.72   0.471    -.8016705    1.733004
          ec    -3.757826   1.527967    -2.46   0.014    -6.752586   -.7630653          ri     1.029479   2.231927     0.46   0.645    -3.345018    5.403976
        crpi     9.707906   1.469475     6.61   0.000     6.827788    12.58802                                                                              
         gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(11)      =    479.88
       overall = 0.9412                                        max =         7       between = 0.9937                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1083                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         6Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        42
F test that all u_i=0:     F(5, 25) =    23.91               Prob > F = 0.0000                                                                              
         rho    .97245143   (fraction of variance due to u_i)     sigma_e    17.053393
     sigma_u    101.32002                                                                              
       _cons    -751.6097    186.298    -4.03   0.000    -1135.298   -367.9217          sb     6.552011   1.275921     5.14   0.000     3.924203    9.179818
         dcp     3.057535   .7441548     4.11   0.000      1.52492    4.590151          ge    -1.143325   .6171931    -1.85   0.076    -2.414458    .1278076
          rp    -3.152218   2.136876    -1.48   0.153    -7.553198    1.248761          gc    -.1386461   .3874551    -0.36   0.723    -.9366247    .6593326
         pmi     1.633674   .6305653     2.59   0.016     .3350003    2.932347          pt     3.081285   .7943755     3.88   0.001     1.445238    4.717332
         tab    -.5567043   .3549512    -1.57   0.129     -1.28774    .1743314          ec      1.89597   1.314732     1.44   0.162    -.8117708    4.603711
          ri     3.469429   1.212611     2.86   0.008     .9720088    5.966849        crpi     2.179825   1.336627     1.63   0.115    -.5730104     4.93266
                                                                                       gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4904                        Prob > F           =    0.0001                                                F(11,25)           =      6.08
       overall = 0.6079                                        max =         7       between = 0.6060                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.7279                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         6Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        42
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BREUSCH AND PAGAN LM TEST 
   HAUSMAN TEST 
   TIME EFFECTS TEST 
   COUNTRY EFFECTS TEST 
        
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.7422                              chi2(1) =     0.11
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u            0              0                       e     290.8182       17.05339
                     gdp     17428.57       132.0173                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)        Estimated results:
        gdp[code,t] = Xb + u[code] + e[code,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      401.53                 chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                                        sb      6.552011     2.502309        4.049701               .
         dcp      3.057535     2.682744        .3747918               .          ge     -1.143325    -2.409003        1.265677               .
          rp     -3.152218     4.335462       -7.487681        1.040953          gc     -.1386461     .1898015       -.3284475               .
         pmi      1.633674    -.5162823        2.149956               .          pt      3.081285     1.954646        1.126639               .
         tab     -.5567043     .4656667       -1.022371               .          ec       1.89597    -3.757826        5.653796               .
          ri      3.469429     1.029479         2.43995               .        crpi      2.179825     9.707906       -7.528081               .
                                                                                                 fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))                      Coefficients     
            Prob > F =    0.7593       F(  6,    19) =    0.56
 ( 6)  _Iyear_2016 = 0 ( 5)  _Iyear_2015 = 0
 ( 4)  _Iyear_2014 = 0 ( 3)  _Iyear_2013 = 0
 ( 2)  _Iyear_2012 = 0 ( 1)  _Iyear_2011 = 0
. test _Iyear_2011 _Iyear_2012 _Iyear_2013 _Iyear_2014 _Iyear_2015 _Iyear_2016
            Prob > F =    0.0000       F(  5,    19) =   18.73
       Constraint 5 dropped ( 6)  _Icode_99 = 0
 ( 5)  o._Icode_58 = 0 ( 4)  _Icode_50 = 0
 ( 3)  _Icode_44 = 0 ( 2)  _Icode_34 = 0
 ( 1)  _Icode_30 = 0
. test _Icode_30 _Icode_34 _Icode_44 _Icode_50 _Icode_58 _Icode_99
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C. GROUP II REGRESSIONS  POOLED OLS MODEL 
  RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
  FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
   
                                                                                     _cons     27.62651    11.5358     2.39   0.022     4.252766    51.00026
          sb     .3519189   .1281701     2.75   0.009     .0922216    .6116163         dcp    -.0642572   .0886794    -0.72   0.473    -.2439387    .1154243
          ge    -.2184679   .0698249    -3.13   0.003    -.3599465   -.0769893          rp    -.0389929    .078475    -0.50   0.622    -.1979984    .1200126
          gc     .0816258   .0417878     1.95   0.058    -.0030443    .1662959         pmi    -.1351471   .1549427    -0.87   0.389    -.4490908    .1787966
          pt    -.2365567    .202183    -1.17   0.249    -.6462185     .173105         tab    -.0686838   .0418588    -1.64   0.109    -.1534978    .0161302
          ec     .1451218   .0841849     1.72   0.093    -.0254531    .3156967          ri      .119419   .0897757     1.33   0.192    -.0624838    .3013218
        crpi    -.1347452   .1147977    -1.17   0.248    -.3673474    .0978569                                                                              
         gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]                                                                              
       Total    1408.45661    48  29.3428461           Root MSE      =  2.9283                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7078
    Residual    317.263203    37  8.57468116           R-squared     =  0.7747       Model    1091.19341    11   99.199401           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11,    37) =   11.57      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      49
                                                                                       rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.7788875     sigma_u            0
                                                                                     _cons     27.62651    11.5358     2.39   0.017     5.016765    50.23626
          sb     .3519189   .1281701     2.75   0.006     .1007101    .6031278         dcp    -.0642572   .0886794    -0.72   0.469    -.2380656    .1095512
          ge    -.2184679   .0698249    -3.13   0.002    -.3553221   -.0816137          rp    -.0389929    .078475    -0.50   0.619    -.1928011    .1148153
          gc     .0816258   .0417878     1.95   0.051    -.0002768    .1635283         pmi    -.1351471   .1549427    -0.87   0.383    -.4388292     .168535
          pt    -.2365567    .202183    -1.17   0.242    -.6328282    .1597147         tab    -.0686838   .0418588    -1.64   0.101    -.1507256     .013358
          ec     .1451218   .0841849     1.72   0.085    -.0198777    .3101212          ri      .119419   .0897757     1.33   0.183    -.0565381    .2953761
        crpi    -.1347452   .1147977    -1.17   0.240    -.3597445    .0902541                                                                              
         gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(11)      =    127.26
       overall = 0.7747                                        max =         7       between = 0.9861                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.0516                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         7Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        49
F test that all u_i=0:     F(6, 31) =    11.54               Prob > F = 0.0000                                                                              
         rho    .98608697   (fraction of variance due to u_i)     sigma_e    1.7788875
     sigma_u    14.975976                                                                              
       _cons    -61.12239   23.94864    -2.55   0.016     -109.966   -12.27881          sb      .278615   .1584811     1.76   0.089    -.0446093    .6018393
         dcp     .0322238   .0716918     0.45   0.656    -.1139926    .1784401          ge     .0186062   .0739553     0.25   0.803    -.1322266    .1694391
          rp     .3084165   .1052916     2.93   0.006     .0936728    .5231602          gc     .0103962   .0352871     0.29   0.770    -.0615724    .0823647
         pmi     .1597436   .1040591     1.54   0.135    -.0524864    .3719736          pt      .106773   .2356152     0.45   0.654    -.3737675    .5873134
         tab     .0180542    .041526     0.43   0.667    -.0666385     .102747          ec     .0749047   .0854968     0.88   0.388    -.0994671    .2492765
          ri     .0063334   .0711819     0.09   0.930    -.1388431    .1515098        crpi     .3097687   .1542701     2.01   0.053    -.0048673    .6244047
                                                                                       gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9319                        Prob > F           =    0.0031                                                F(11,31)           =      3.46
       overall = 0.0511                                        max =         7       between = 0.0848                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.5511                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         7Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        49
18 | P a g e   
BREUSCH AND PAGAN LM TEST 
   HAUSMAN TEST 
   TIME EFFECTS TEST 
   COUNTRY EFFECTS TEST 
       
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.4833                              chi2(1) =     0.49
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u            0              0                       e     3.164441       1.778887
                     gdp     29.34285       5.416904                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)        Estimated results:
        gdp[code,t] = Xb + u[code] + e[code,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      102.76                 chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                                        sb       .278615     .3519189        -.073304         .093213
         dcp      .0322238    -.0642572         .096481               .          ge      .0186062    -.2184679        .2370741        .0243696
          rp      .3084165    -.0389929        .3474093        .0701997          gc      .0103962     .0816258       -.0712296               .
         pmi      .1597436    -.1351471        .2948907               .          pt       .106773    -.2365567        .3433297        .1209816
         tab      .0180542    -.0686838         .086738               .          ec      .0749047     .1451218       -.0702171        .0149195
          ri      .0063334      .119419       -.1130856               .        crpi      .3097687    -.1347452        .4445139        .1030571
                                                                                                 fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
            Prob > F =    0.0017       F(  6,    25) =    5.03
 ( 6)  _Iyear_2016 = 0 ( 5)  _Iyear_2015 = 0
 ( 4)  _Iyear_2014 = 0 ( 3)  _Iyear_2013 = 0
 ( 2)  _Iyear_2012 = 0 ( 1)  _Iyear_2011 = 0
. test _Iyear_2011 _Iyear_2012 _Iyear_2013 _Iyear_2014 _Iyear_2015 _Iyear_2016
            Prob > F =    0.0000       F(  6,    25) =   17.27
       Constraint 2 dropped ( 7)  _Icode_94 = 0
 ( 6)  _Icode_90 = 0 ( 5)  _Icode_85 = 0
 ( 4)  _Icode_78 = 0 ( 3)  _Icode_54 = 0
 ( 2)  o._Icode_32 = 0 ( 1)  _Icode_18 = 0
. test _Icode_18 _Icode_32 _Icode_54 _Icode_78 _Icode_85 _Icode_90 _Icode_94
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D. GROUP III REGRESSIONS  POOLED OLS MODEL 
  RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
  FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
  
                                                                                     _cons     2.696371   2.928473     0.92   0.362    -3.205579    8.598321
          sb     .0161943   .0218264     0.74   0.462     -.027794    .0601826         dcp    -.0233906   .0291823    -0.80   0.427    -.0822035    .0354224
          ge    -.1040347   .0269222    -3.86   0.000    -.1582928   -.0497767          rp    -.0707109   .0346427    -2.04   0.047    -.1405286   -.0008933
          gc     .0928405   .0132243     7.02   0.000     .0661888    .1194923         pmi      .014804   .0336526     0.44   0.662    -.0530183    .0826262
          pt     .0958471   .0384832     2.49   0.017     .0182894    .1734049         tab     .0681386   .0169159     4.03   0.000     .0340469    .1022303
          ec    -.0157699   .0572843    -0.28   0.784    -.1312188    .0996791          ri     -.150922    .033461    -4.51   0.000    -.2183581   -.0834859
        crpi     .0353022   .0482573     0.73   0.468    -.0619539    .1325584                                                                              
         gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]                                                                              
       Total    493.948534    55  8.98088244           Root MSE      =  1.3928                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7840
    Residual     85.354513    44   1.9398753           R-squared     =  0.8272       Model    408.594021    11   37.144911           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11,    44) =   19.15      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      56
                                                                                       rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .47370427     sigma_u            0
                                                                                     _cons     2.696371   2.928473     0.92   0.357    -3.043331    8.436073
          sb     .0161943   .0218264     0.74   0.458    -.0265847    .0589733         dcp    -.0233906   .0291823    -0.80   0.423    -.0805867    .0338056
          ge    -.1040347   .0269222    -3.86   0.000    -.1568012   -.0512682          rp    -.0707109   .0346427    -2.04   0.041    -.1386093   -.0028126
          gc     .0928405   .0132243     7.02   0.000     .0669215    .1187596         pmi      .014804   .0336526     0.44   0.660    -.0511538    .0807617
          pt     .0958471   .0384832     2.49   0.013     .0204215    .1712728         tab     .0681386   .0169159     4.03   0.000     .0349841    .1012931
          ec    -.0157699   .0572843    -0.28   0.783    -.1280451    .0965054          ri     -.150922    .033461    -4.51   0.000    -.2165043   -.0853397
        crpi     .0353022   .0482573     0.73   0.464    -.0592803    .1298848                                                                              
         gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(11)      =    210.63
       overall = 0.8272                                        max =         7       between = 0.9710                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.0501                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         8Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        56
F test that all u_i=0:     F(7, 37) =    49.05               Prob > F = 0.0000                                                                              
         rho    .98190194   (fraction of variance due to u_i)     sigma_e    .47370427
     sigma_u    3.4891958                                                                              
       _cons    -1.702266   2.353912    -0.72   0.474    -6.471746    3.067214          sb     .0155768    .010984     1.42   0.165     -.006679    .0378325
         dcp     .0146573   .0219384     0.67   0.508    -.0297942    .0591088          ge     .0008192   .0201357     0.04   0.968    -.0399796     .041618
          rp    -.0048998   .0237822    -0.21   0.838    -.0530871    .0432874          gc      .017781   .0103442     1.72   0.094    -.0031783    .0387403
         pmi    -.0139381   .0124919    -1.12   0.272    -.0392491     .011373          pt     .0414616    .019029     2.18   0.036     .0029051    .0800181
         tab    -.0141386   .0090269    -1.57   0.126    -.0324289    .0041517          ec     .0162964    .032078     0.51   0.614    -.0486998    .0812925
          ri     .0420942   .0385873     1.09   0.282    -.0360911    .1202796        crpi     .0105373   .0214354     0.49   0.626    -.0328949    .0539695
                                                                                       gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4569                        Prob > F           =    0.0059                                                F(11,37)           =      3.01
       overall = 0.0276                                        max =         7       between = 0.0529                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4722                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =         8Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        56
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BREUSCH AND PAGAN LM TEST 
   HAUSMAN TEST 
   TIME EFFECTS TEST 
   COUNTRY EFFECTS TEST 
   
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0723                              chi2(1) =     3.23
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u            0              0                       e     .2243957       .4737043
                     gdp     8.980882       2.996812                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)        Estimated results:
        gdp[code,t] = Xb + u[code] + e[code,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                                        see suest for a generalized test                                        assumptions of the Hausman test;
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic                          =  -146.85    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these
                 chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                                        sb      .0155768     .0161943       -.0006175               .
         dcp      .0146573    -.0233906        .0380479               .          ge      .0008192    -.1040347         .104854               .
          rp     -.0048998    -.0707109        .0658111               .          gc       .017781     .0928405       -.0750595               .
         pmi     -.0139381      .014804        -.028742               .          pt      .0414616     .0958471       -.0543855               .
         tab     -.0141386     .0681386       -.0822772               .          ec      .0162964    -.0157699        .0320663               .
          ri      .0420942     -.150922        .1930162        .0192183        crpi      .0105373     .0353022       -.0247649               .
                                                                                                 fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
            Prob > F =    0.1236       F(  6,    31) =    1.84
 ( 6)  _Iyear_2016 = 0 ( 5)  _Iyear_2015 = 0
 ( 4)  _Iyear_2014 = 0 ( 3)  _Iyear_2013 = 0
 ( 2)  _Iyear_2012 = 0 ( 1)  _Iyear_2011 = 0
. test _Iyear_2011 _Iyear_2012 _Iyear_2013 _Iyear_2014 _Iyear_2015 _Iyear_2016
            Prob > F =    0.0000       F(  7,    31) =   43.75
       Constraint 4 dropped       Constraint 2 dropped
 ( 9)  _Icode_91 = 0 ( 8)  _Icode_88 = 0
 ( 7)  _Icode_74 = 0 ( 6)  _Icode_66 = 0
 ( 5)  _Icode_47 = 0 ( 4)  o._Icode_31 = 0
 ( 3)  _Icode_25 = 0 ( 2)  o._Icode_23 = 0
 ( 1)  _Icode_22 = 0
> e_88 _Icode_91. test _Icode_22 _Icode_23 _Icode_25 _Icode_31 _Icode_47 _Icode_66 _Icode_74 _Icod
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E. DATA USED IN THE STUDY 
Country Code Year SB DCP GE RP GC PMI PT TAB EC RI CRPI GDP 
Angola 10 2010 52.04 70.15 41.71 27.83 18.75 53.33 59.07 25.89 26.47 . 19 82.47 
Angola 10 2011 46.46 76.07 40.97 27.61 18.75 53.33 58.55 27.31 25.22 . 20 104.12 
Angola 10 2012 51.28 75.19 42.57 44.36 18.75 53.33 58.54 35.23 25.22 . 22 115.4 
Angola 10 2013 53.82 75.35 56.27 46.41 18.75 53.33 58.54 39.34 25.22 . 23 124.91 
Angola 10 2014 55.63 75.43 56.53 46.55 18.75 53.33 58.67 40.15 25.22 . 19 126.78 
Angola 10 2015 57.15 75.47 56.66 46.62 5.00 51.67 58.37 40.96 25.22 . 15 102.96 
Angola 10 2016 76.79 75.53 56.84 46.72 5.00 55.00 60.22 19.27 26.26 . 18 89.63 
Burundi 15 2010 68.35 36.10 30.92 57.52 18.75 26.67 45.31 16.65 42.15 7.35 18 2.03 
Burundi 15 2011 71.03 36.10 30.92 57.74 18.75 26.67 41.65 18.00 42.15 8.71 19 2.36 
Burundi 15 2012 71.97 36.10 30.92 57.82 18.75 56.67 66.41 22.31 42.15 9.06 19 2.47 
Burundi 15 2013 91.66 53.89 30.92 63.14 18.75 56.67 66.41 27.47 42.15 8.64 21 2.71 
Burundi 15 2014 93.74 60.16 35.27 77.81 18.75 56.67 67.04 33.52 42.15 8.27 20 3.09 
Burundi 15 2015 94.25 64.16 35.27 78.38 10.00 51.67 69.45 37.50 42.15 7.98 21 3.1 
Burundi 15 2016 94.51 64.22 35.27 78.38 10.00 41.67 69.45 47.38 45.74 7.80 20 3.01 
Botswana 18 2010 71.89 58.96 72.05 78.78 62.50 60.00 78.09 43.98 61.29 61.92 58 12.79 
Botswana 18 2011 71.88 58.63 71.92 78.82 62.50 60.00 77.47 44.07 62.98 65.48 61 15.68 
Botswana 18 2012 78.17 59.46 72.28 78.72 62.50 60.00 77.47 47.56 64.02 66.31 65 14.69 
Botswana 18 2013 78.21 60.10 72.51 78.62 62.50 60.00 77.47 51.42 64.02 66.64 64 14.92 
Botswana 18 2014 77.95 74.80 72.36 78.65 62.50 60.00 77.47 51.38 64.02 66.64 63 16.26 
Botswana 18 2015 76.20 74.87 72.56 78.60 55.00 49.17 77.47 52.02 64.02 67.46 63 14.43 
Botswana 18 2016 76.21 74.93 79.11 78.56 55.00 55.00 77.47 85.93 50.95 68.69 60 15.27 
Comoros 23 2010 46.91 83.40 74.61 53.71 18.75 33.33 47.37 58.31 33.20 . 21 0.53 
Comoros 23 2011 48.73 83.53 75.53 53.71 18.75 33.33 47.37 58.73 33.20 . 24 0.59 
Comoros 23 2012 48.31 83.54 75.41 53.71 37.50 33.33 47.37 59.11 33.20 . 28 0.57 
Comoros 23 2013 52.61 83.47 75.02 63.67 37.50 33.33 47.37 58.84 33.20 . 28 0.62 
Comoros 23 2014 59.96 83.66 76.06 63.78 37.50 33.33 47.37 59.07 33.20 . 26 0.65 
Comoros 23 2015 61.03 83.28 76.46 63.83 30.00 45.83 47.37 59.33 33.20 . 26 0.57 
Comoros 23 2016 72.89 83.20 76.14 63.79 40.00 40.00 47.37 66.18 32.05 . 24 0.62 
Djibouti 25 2010 26.12 61.31 37.63 50.84 6.25 23.33 82.51 77.20 37.31 40.50 32 1.13 
Djibouti 25 2011 26.12 61.97 37.63 51.17 6.25 23.33 73.90 77.30 37.31 40.17 30 1.24 
Djibouti 25 2012 26.12 57.26 45.60 51.18 6.25 23.33 74.31 77.91 37.31 41.17 36 1.35 
Djibouti 25 2013 27.69 58.32 46.94 51.43 6.25 23.33 74.31 78.24 37.31 41.22 36 1.46 
Djibouti 25 2014 61.01 58.65 48.13 51.50 12.50 23.33 74.56 78.50 37.31 41.48 34 1.59 
Djibouti 25 2015 65.89 63.54 50.18 51.63 5.00 39.17 74.56 78.65 37.31 39.83 34 1.73 
Djibouti 25 2016 66.45 64.00 51.86 51.73 5.00 30.00 74.56 51.87 28.39 41.06 30 1.84 
Egypt 30 2010 85.85 65.00 75.75 67.16 56.25 36.67 55.30 65.83 44.02 18.10 31 218.9 
Egypt 30 2011 87.06 66.05 76.02 67.25 56.25 36.67 57.68 69.45 44.02 18.77 29 236 
Egypt 30 2012 87.13 66.46 76.24 67.33 56.25 36.67 57.15 70.07 44.02 29.52 32 279.4 
Egypt 30 2013 87.13 68.35 76.49 67.41 56.25 36.67 59.76 70.65 44.02 29.42 32 288.6 
Egypt 30 2014 87.22 68.98 76.73 69.09 56.25 36.67 61.03 71.15 44.02 28.79 37 305.5 
Egypt 30 2015 87.28 69.33 76.86 69.66 50.00 44.17 58.96 71.56 44.02 28.60 36 332.7 
Egypt 30 2016 87.48 69.66 76.99 69.81 50.00 48.33 58.87 42.23 40.90 28.97 34 336.3 
Eritrea 31 2010 33.25 . 62.16 39.68 12.50 26.67 43.06 19.73 65.03 . 26 2.12 
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Eritrea 31 2011 35.95 . 65.84 39.70 12.50 26.67 43.06 25.67 64.34 . 25 2.61 
Eritrea 31 2012 38.36 . 64.69 39.73 12.50 26.67 43.06 27.66 63.52 . 25 3.09 
Eritrea 31 2013 42.14 . 68.51 39.76 12.50 26.67 43.06 29.49 62.70 . 20 3.44 
Eritrea 31 2014 42.80 . 69.15 39.77 12.50 26.67 43.49 30.99 62.70 . 18 3.86 
Eritrea 31 2015 44.81 . 70.28 39.78 . 38.33 43.49 32.24 62.70 . 18 4.05 
Eritrea 31 2016 46.16 . 71.23 39.79 . 35.00 43.49 . 52.75 . 18 4.2 
Ethiopia 44 2010 30.39 66.33 65.97 61.34 25.00 16.67 75.36 18.00 65.43 34.61 27 29.93 
Ethiopia 44 2011 32.41 71.48 71.07 61.47 25.00 16.67 75.36 26.97 65.43 33.66 27 31.95 
Ethiopia 44 2012 27.95 75.99 69.58 61.51 25.00 16.67 75.36 28.38 65.43 33.85 33 43.31 
Ethiopia 44 2013 37.65 77.85 72.76 61.60 25.00 16.67 67.86 33.79 65.43 27.93 33 47.65 
Ethiopia 44 2014 46.57 47.34 75.52 61.67 25.00 16.67 69.22 39.14 65.43 29.04 33 55.61 
Ethiopia 44 2015 49.22 47.34 76.39 61.69 15.00 41.67 66.83 38.58 65.43 31.03 33 64.46 
Ethiopia 44 2016 53.64 47.34 77.46 61.72 15.00 31.67 66.27 42.39 59.06 31.88 34 72.37 
Kenya 50 2010 69.11 82.50 69.56 54.31 62.50 50.00 48.09 49.33 55.15 34.04 21 40 
Kenya 50 2011 70.31 74.70 69.35 54.25 62.50 50.00 49.32 51.66 55.15 32.10 22 41.95 
Kenya 50 2012 70.01 74.79 69.47 54.08 62.50 50.00 49.55 52.02 55.15 33.27 27 50.41 
Kenya 50 2013 72.31 71.66 72.85 54.19 62.50 50.00 54.88 52.05 50.98 31.79 27 55.1 
Kenya 50 2014 72.61 72.16 71.59 54.25 62.50 50.00 59.62 53.67 50.98 26.57 25 61.45 
Kenya 50 2015 72.52 60.58 71.88 52.29 35.00 45.83 71.34 54.49 50.98 29.12 25 63.77 
Kenya 50 2016 74.45 58.56 78.10 54.58 70.00 53.33 71.34 66.38 58.27 30.04 26 70.53 
Lesotho 66 2010 77.38 43.97 60.21 52.34 37.50 36.67 76.39 45.16 46.84 27.94 35 2.39 
Lesotho 66 2011 77.50 43.97 60.24 52.32 37.50 36.67 76.37 53.78 46.84 29.90 35 2.79 
Lesotho 66 2012 77.69 43.97 61.10 52.49 37.50 36.67 76.39 53.95 46.84 30.76 45 2.68 
Lesotho 66 2013 82.39 45.80 64.02 52.64 37.50 50.00 69.72 57.26 53.94 30.89 49 2.53 
Lesotho 66 2014 82.59 49.70 66.78 65.72 37.50 50.00 69.72 58.45 53.94 31.12 49 2.52 
Lesotho 66 2015 82.84 54.46 68.20 66.36 25.00 49.17 69.72 57.86 53.94 31.26 44 2.34 
Lesotho 66 2016 82.85 54.75 68.28 66.40 50.00 50.00 69.72 91.60 57.18 30.96 39 2.2 
M/gascar 74 2010 68.07 44.37 26.24 49.49 12.50 56.67 73.09 62.53 45.91 16.42 26 8.73 
M/gascar 74 2011 64.52 44.37 21.57 48.46 12.50 56.67 73.51 65.07 45.91 16.42 30 9.89 
M/gascar 74 2012 80.64 44.37 24.30 46.86 12.50 56.67 73.92 66.10 45.91 15.13 32 9.92 
M/gascar 74 2013 80.89 44.37 21.31 47.46 12.50 56.67 74.61 66.79 45.91 14.11 28 10.61 
M/gascar 74 2014 80.95 42.84 21.50 47.43 12.50 56.67 75.93 68.17 45.91 12.22 28 10.67 
M/gascar 74 2015 81.22 38.06 22.97 47.52 5.00 53.33 76.32 68.98 49.21 12.22 28 9.74 
M/gascar 74 2016 79.63 38.06 24.36 49.83 15.00 48.33 76.32 60.95 42.85 12.22 26 9.99 
Moza 78 2010 75.76 63.93 69.57 57.23 18.75 53.33 66.66 60.22 34.61 27.22 27 10.15 
Moza 78 2011 79.80 64.79 71.57 58.86 18.75 53.33 66.66 60.68 34.61 29.26 27 13.13 
Moza 78 2012 80.13 66.12 55.65 60.20 18.75 53.33 66.66 61.47 34.61 30.33 31 14.53 
Moza 78 2013 80.21 66.97 56.47 61.05 18.75 53.33 66.66 62.23 34.61 29.98 30 16.02 
Moza 78 2014 80.30 76.07 55.67 61.86 18.75 53.33 67.09 64.18 34.61 35.81 31 16.96 
Moza 78 2015 80.43 76.69 57.19 67.70 30.00 51.67 67.09 64.76 34.61 36.50 31 14.8 
Moza 78 2016 80.23 78.99 57.83 68.10 25.00 43.33 67.78 66.31 27.32 36.76 27 11.01 
Mauritius 85 2010 91.36 62.86 83.30 64.15 56.25 76.67 91.45 86.37 61.91 59.15 54 10 
Mauritius 85 2011 91.40 62.96 83.44 64.18 56.25 76.67 91.29 86.98 63.96 61.94 51 11.52 
Mauritius 85 2012 91.43 63.01 83.52 64.84 56.25 76.67 91.45 87.07 63.96 61.94 57 11.67 
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Mauritius 85 2013 91.46 63.09 84.10 65.98 68.75 76.67 91.10 87.55 63.96 72.04 52 12.13 
Mauritius 85 2014 91.43 61.80 84.15 65.99 75.00 76.67 91.92 87.60 64.91 72.32 54 12.8 
Mauritius 85 2015 91.61 64.41 84.17 65.95 65.00 65.00 91.92 87.74 66.22 72.50 53 11.68 
Mauritius 85 2016 91.63 73.12 84.24 65.97 65.00 65.00 91.92 78.67 68.65 72.50 54 12.16 
Malawi 88 2010 64.34 74.69 20.43 65.04 43.75 53.33 83.21 23.22 36.27 18.87 34 6.96 
Malawi 88 2011 64.29 74.69 20.43 71.25 43.75 53.33 83.32 25.40 36.27 19.31 30 8 
Malawi 88 2012 66.49 74.88 20.43 68.16 43.75 53.33 82.00 30.74 36.27 19.92 37 6.03 
Malawi 88 2013 60.03 74.78 20.43 67.35 43.75 53.33 75.59 30.20 36.27 19.92 37 5.52 
Malawi 88 2014 61.83 74.94 23.03 70.88 43.75 53.33 72.31 33.91 43.73 16.75 33 6.05 
Malawi 88 2015 66.96 75.09 35.78 71.07 25.00 45.00 71.51 37.40 43.73 12.99 31 6.37 
Malawi 88 2016 69.71 75.26 48.20 71.27 45.00 43.33 71.82 63.32 46.48 13.39 31 5.44 
Namibia 90 2010 67.76 82.25 75.45 56.65 68.75 53.33 66.17 64.37 63.73 33.44 44 11.27 
Namibia 90 2011 68.00 83.03 75.70 52.45 68.75 53.33 66.17 64.77 63.73 36.29 44 12.41 
Namibia 90 2012 68.16 83.13 75.91 52.90 68.75 53.33 66.17 64.34 63.73 36.97 48 13.02 
Namibia 90 2013 67.99 82.79 78.55 46.52 68.75 53.33 73.57 65.01 63.73 37.55 48 12.71 
Namibia 90 2014 68.46 83.05 78.92 41.54 68.75 53.33 73.57 66.12 64.82 37.61 49 12.85 
Namibia 90 2015 68.67 83.17 78.94 41.61 55.00 53.33 73.57 63.17 64.82 37.93 53 11.49 
Namibia 90 2016 68.92 81.87 79.19 41.70 60.00 55.00 73.63 61.47 56.03 37.57 52 10.27 
Rwanda 91 2010 89.76 54.31 66.47 78.06 43.75 63.33 78.03 38.04 63.58 3.46 40 5.77 
Rwanda 91 2011 89.91 59.72 69.44 78.98 43.75 63.33 78.64 44.45 64.40 3.47 50 6.49 
Rwanda 91 2012 90.42 61.42 72.80 67.65 43.75 63.33 83.09 47.87 64.40 3.45 53 7.32 
Rwanda 91 2013 85.52 62.87 75.88 69.45 81.25 63.33 83.93 49.42 65.44 3.39 53 7.62 
Rwanda 91 2014 85.70 54.47 75.59 89.15 87.50 66.67 80.76 51.84 65.44 20.50 49 8.02 
Rwanda 91 2015 80.60 65.27 79.48 89.20 90.00 46.67 80.96 44.67 63.94 21.03 54 8.26 
Rwanda 91 2016 82.92 66.11 80.06 89.23 95.00 51.67 81.48 71.19 56.76 20.63 54 8.38 
Sudan 34 2010 72.28 47.34 62.96 77.78 25.00 30.00 66.89 30.68 40.43 34.51 16 65.63 
Sudan 34 2011 70.89 48.41 64.52 77.86 25.00 30.00 66.89 30.68 40.43 34.82 16 67.33 
Sudan 34 2012 71.45 50.56 65.10 77.94 25.00 30.00 66.89 30.68 40.43 35.78 13 68.13 
Sudan 34 2013 73.52 55.53 70.95 78.35 25.00 30.00 66.89 33.32 40.43 35.78 11 72.07 
Sudan 34 2014 73.48 55.25 67.22 78.34 25.00 30.00 62.34 42.66 40.43 35.78 11 82.15 
Sudan 34 2015 73.84 55.81 63.30 78.40 15.00 31.67 62.34 46.98 40.43 34.32 12 97.16 
Sudan 34 2016 75.14 59.04 69.65 78.65 15.00 21.67 62.34 19.16 46.91 34.14 14 95.58 
Swaziland 22 2010 64.60 75.03 59.80 55.25 62.50 20.00 74.94 52.91 35.93 37.58 32 4.44 
Swaziland 22 2011 65.72 75.10 60.03 55.46 62.50 43.33 74.87 59.97 35.93 40.48 31 4.82 
Swaziland 22 2012 66.20 75.40 60.73 58.80 62.50 43.33 74.49 58.65 35.93 41.10 37 4.81 
Swaziland 22 2013 66.85 75.80 61.68 58.78 62.50 43.33 74.87 62.46 36.37 41.22 39 4.58 
Swaziland 22 2014 70.91 75.52 61.01 58.80 62.50 43.33 74.60 64.36 36.37 41.41 43 4.49 
Swaziland 22 2015 73.47 75.86 61.81 58.78 55.00 47.50 74.51 65.43 36.37 41.60 42 4.14 
Swaziland 22 2016 73.46 75.85 61.80 58.78 50.00 43.33 75.54 92.68 33.94 41.50 43 3.73 
Seychelles 47 2010 76.20 73.22 62.76 71.01 25.00 56.67 76.12 77.06 61.62 42.73 48 0.97 
Seychelles 47 2011 76.50 73.45 62.39 71.01 25.00 56.67 77.16 79.11 61.20 40.53 48 1.07 
Seychelles 47 2012 76.68 73.59 62.63 71.00 25.00 56.67 85.68 79.45 55.88 42.19 52 1.13 
Seychelles 47 2013 76.87 73.76 62.93 71.00 25.00 56.67 84.16 79.79 55.88 42.66 54 1.41 
Seychelles 47 2014 78.32 73.83 64.18 71.00 25.00 56.67 84.16 81.73 55.88 41.90 55 1.42 
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Seychelles 47 2015 78.42 71.30 64.32 71.00 10.00 58.33 81.85 81.65 56.92 41.83 55 1.44 
Seychelles 47 2016 78.55 71.37 64.50 71.00 40.00 50.00 81.82 71.79 51.25 42.31 55 1.43 
Tanzania 99 2010 74.44 45.43 49.34 56.48 43.75 53.33 59.91 54.38 66.17 22.96 27 31.4 
Tanzania 99 2011 75.27 48.64 71.37 56.49 43.75 53.33 59.91 55.33 66.17 23.58 30 33.88 
Tanzania 99 2012 75.57 49.89 72.11 59.27 43.75 53.33 59.70 61.63 66.17 23.64 35 39.1 
Tanzania 99 2013 77.85 47.48 73.26 60.20 43.75 53.33 59.70 59.94 66.17 23.38 33 44.34 
Tanzania 99 2014 78.37 49.83 74.30 60.07 43.75 53.33 59.29 60.65 66.17 23.08 31 48.2 
Tanzania 99 2015 77.71 52.03 75.28 60.10 25.00 43.33 58.95 62.96 66.17 22.87 30 45.63 
Tanzania 99 2016 78.93 56.03 77.05 60.16 65.00 40.00 59.04 20.21 61.66 22.64 32 47.43 
Uganda 54 2010 59.26 39.24 40.86 55.96 43.75 46.67 73.76 31.09 54.84 44.23 25 20.18 
Uganda 54 2011 59.74 41.63 53.80 56.01 43.75 46.67 73.76 38.33 55.38 42.75 24 20.51 
Uganda 54 2012 63.91 45.02 33.48 60.15 43.75 46.67 72.52 39.98 55.38 43.30 29 23.52 
Uganda 54 2013 64.14 47.74 33.48 58.42 43.75 46.67 72.53 39.13 55.38 41.87 26 24.88 
Uganda 54 2014 64.19 46.82 33.48 62.01 43.75 46.67 71.32 45.67 60.48 38.72 26 27.93 
Uganda 54 2015 65.92 53.38 33.48 62.70 30.00 47.50 72.76 48.01 60.48 40.80 25 27.86 
Uganda 54 2016 69.26 57.45 40.14 62.73 65.00 50.00 72.76 58.90 60.60 42.10 25 25.53 
RSA 58 2010 80.73 71.84 56.88 60.48 81.25 80.00 87.30 57.08 65.10 34.69 45 375.35 
RSA 58 2011 80.72 71.91 56.57 60.10 81.25 80.00 87.20 58.22 66.14 37.03 41 416.42 
RSA 58 2012 81.42 71.50 55.15 67.31 81.25 80.00 86.96 60.00 66.14 37.93 43 396.33 
RSA 58 2013 81.43 71.57 55.46 66.69 81.25 80.00 86.78 70.42 66.14 38.05 42 366.62 
RSA 58 2014 81.43 71.57 55.62 66.18 81.25 80.00 88.90 71.18 66.14 38.23 44 350.85 
RSA 58 2015 79.71 68.71 55.74 66.02 60.00 67.50 88.81 71.05 66.14 38.40 44 317.41 
RSA 58 2016 79.71 68.67 84.21 65.50 60.00 70.00 88.85 58.01 54.10 37.96 45 294.84 
DRC 32 2010 30.15 72.13 36.52 42.03 18.75 23.33 32.77 18.10 30.36 . 20 12.01 
DRC 32 2011 39.92 83.77 36.52 49.45 18.75 23.33 31.32 22.27 30.36 . 20 14.43 
DRC 32 2012 44.70 84.07 36.52 50.48 18.75 23.33 31.32 26.98 30.36 . 21 13.68 
DRC 32 2013 46.46 84.19 36.52 50.91 18.75 23.33 31.32 28.61 30.36 . 22 14.09 
DRC 32 2014 26.77 84.49 36.52 52.66 37.50 26.67 49.49 30.39 33.51 . 22 14.18 
DRC 32 2015 57.67 62.08 43.19 55.39 30.00 42.50 44.88 29.09 33.51 . 22 8.55 
DRC 32 2016 85.49 71.02 44.49 55.47 30.00 36.67 43.50 1.26 36.06 . 21 7.83 
Zambia 94 2010 82.90 62.39 64.05 64.95 56.25 56.67 73.65 22.30 57.53 32.49 30 20.27 
Zambia 94 2011 83.04 62.54 63.84 67.28 56.25 56.67 73.65 20.38 57.53 29.26 32 23.46 
Zambia 94 2012 83.17 65.08 63.56 63.34 56.25 56.67 73.65 20.38 57.53 31.58 37 25.5 
Zambia 94 2013 81.80 69.90 64.42 63.65 87.50 56.67 73.65 20.38 57.53 32.09 38 28.05 
Zambia 94 2014 85.09 71.20 65.05 62.84 87.50 56.67 73.65 21.77 57.53 39.91 38 27.15 
Zambia 94 2015 84.95 71.92 65.54 51.75 70.00 54.17 74.52 20.92 57.53 45.77 38 21.15 
Zambia 94 2016 84.88 73.27 66.34 45.82 75.00 53.33 79.91 46.99 49.89 48.87 38 19.55 
Zimbabwe 12 2010 38.27 31.63 39.16 61.90 62.50 46.67 56.17 15.45 62.41 0.05 24 10.05 
Zimbabwe 12 2011 40.24 35.29 42.45 65.65 62.50 46.67 58.28 19.64 41.03 0.22 22 12.07 
Zimbabwe 12 2012 45.47 41.00 49.65 66.99 62.50 46.67 60.41 22.67 41.03 10.73 20 14.06 
Zimbabwe 12 2013 49.17 26.67 57.09 66.18 62.50 46.67 60.31 25.76 41.03 0.06 21 15.22 
Zimbabwe 12 2014 47.92 26.67 56.73 66.14 62.50 46.67 60.46 24.35 43.25 14.07 21 15.83 
Zimbabwe 12 2015 49.03 26.67 58.26 66.32 40.00 53.33 60.41 19.40 43.25 14.81 21 16.07 
Zimbabwe 12 2016 49.22 26.67 58.54 66.35 50.00 51.67 60.28 55.65 38.73 17.38 22 16.29  
